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DANIEL BAHLS

SPLITTING THE BABY: AVOIDING
FORECLOSURE WHEN HOMEOWNERS HAVE
UNCERTAIN OR CONFLICTING INTERESTS
DANIEL BAHLS*
And the king said, “[d]ivide the living child in two, and give half to
the one, and half to the other.” Then the woman whose son was alive
said to the king, because her heart yearned for her son, “Oh, my lord,
give her the living child, and by no means slay it.” But the other
1
said, “[i]t shall be neither mine nor yours; divide it.”

INTRODUCTION
Cleaving an infant in twain results in a substantial loss of utility for
both the baby and those who hold it dear.2 The threat of forcing such a
result can give one party an extraordinary and inequitable amount of
control over another. As the story illustrates, this result should be
avoided whenever possible.3 An analogous, albeit less gruesome,
problem arises where one party is threatened with the loss of a home and
the shelter it provides through foreclosure due to the concern that a coowner might lose a trivial amount of home equity. Preventing
foreclosure can avert significant losses to homeowners, their families,
lenders, and the surrounding community.4 This Article explores how
homeownership can be preserved in cases where a homeowner is not
able to secure the full cooperation of all borrowers on the account.5 This
* Daniel Bahls is an attorney in Western Massachusetts serving indigent clients
facing foreclosure. The author would like to thank Marge Kennard, Joshua Gutierrez, Carolyn
Dekker, and Laura Gal for helpful feedback through the process of drafting this Article.
1. 1 Kings 3:25-26 (Rev. Standard Version).
2. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 135, 154 (1991).
3. See 1 Kings 3:27 (Rev. Standard Version).
4. See, e.g., Daniel Bahls & Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of
Equitable Jurisdiction in a Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REV. 779, 782 (2012).
5. For the purpose of this Article, the term “owner” is used expansively to include any
and all title claimants, even if a formal interest in the estate is incomplete. For example, if a
home is a marital asset in a contested divorce, this Article considers both spouses “owners”
even if only one spouse is on the deed. Similarly, an heir or devisee would be considered an
owner even if a probate process is incomplete. By contrast, a “borrower” is used to refer to a
person who is named as the account holder of the lender (i.e. the person who borrowed the
money, whether or not that person still owns the house).
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includes cases where one co-owner wants to retain a home but is
hampered by another co-owner who is unresponsive, uncooperative, or
even openly hostile, as well as cases where an owner claiming title is not
the original borrower on the account.
Avoiding preventable foreclosure has become a common theme for
lenders, consumer advocates, and policymakers.6 Finding alternatives to
foreclosure has been difficult, even in the best of circumstances.7 Past
scholarship has explored conflicts of interest between the various lenderside entities and suggested ways to promote foreclosure alternatives
despite these conflicts.8 Thus far, insufficient attention has been given to
avoiding foreclosure where homeowners are similarly unable to speak
with a clear and united voice.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief survey of the foreclosure
prevention landscape and the relatively recent changes that have altered
the calculus of when foreclosure can be averted. It reviews existing
literature on situations where internal conflicts on the lender’s side
prevent or inhibit foreclosure avoidance.
Part II addresses the circumstances in which borrowers might be
unable to present a united front in negotiations with the lender. This
section includes a discussion of why these problems are of particular
societal concern and why, in many cases, the most equitable result
requires one owner or the other to retain ownership of the property.
Finally, Part II discusses the cases of special concern where domestic
abusers try to force a home into foreclosure as an extension of a pattern
of abuse and control.
Part III of this Article will address the mechanics that make
foreclosure prevention particularly challenging where full cooperation
from all borrowers or owners cannot be secured.
Part IV begins with a discussion of partial solutions that advocates,
judges, or other interested parties may be able to use to solve or avoid
problems with existing law and prevailing policies. It will also highlight
specific policies that lenders could change to resolve these problems in
mutually beneficial ways. Part V argues that the diverse rights and
interests of parties involved in a mortgage foreclosure cannot be
6. See, e.g., Heather Scheiwe Kulp & Jennifer Shack, A (Mortgage) Crisis in
Communication: Foreclosure Dispute Resolution As Effective Response?, 66 ARK. L. REV.
185, 186 (2013); Geoff Walsh, The Finger in the Dike: State and Local Laws Combat the
Foreclosure Tide, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 158 (2011).
7. Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in
Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 624 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Diane E. Thompson, Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives
Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV. 755, 802 (2011).
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adequately protected without joining all interested parties in one judicial
action. The stakes are too high for non-judicial foreclosure.
I. FORECLOSURE, HOME PRESERVATION, AND NON-COOPERATIVE
BORROWERS
A. Avoiding Foreclosure in 2014
Due to the wide expansion of foreclosure alternatives over the past
six years, a foreclosure requires two failures. First, a borrower fails to
make some payment that the lender believes is due.9 Second, the lender
and borrower must fail to arrive at some alternative to foreclosure.10
Although this Article focuses on preserving homeownership, foreclosure
alternatives such as short-sales or deeds-in-lieu are similarly more
efficient than foreclosure.11
Because state law governs the foreclosure process,12 the precise
timeline and process varies significantly from state to state.13 Some
states require a court judgment for a foreclosure while other states
require no judicial process.14 Responses by state legislatures have
similarly varied.15 Claims and defenses available to homeowners
opposing foreclosure and resources available to struggling homeowners
9. See, e.g., Security Instruments: Form 3022: Massachusetts Mortgage, Freddie Mac, ¶
22, available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (last visited May 13,
2014).
10. See generally Grace B. Pazdan, How Foreclosure Mediation Legislation Can Keep
Vermonters in Their Homes (and Money in the Pockets of Mortgage Holders), 36 VT. B.J. 24,
25 (Spring 2010) (discussing foreclosure alternatives and common barriers to reaching them in
mediation); Samuel C. Waters, A View from the Trenches: The Legal Practitioner and Loss
Mitigation, 60 S.C. L. REV. 807, 808 (2009) (noting that the cost of foreclosure exceeds that of
“any alternative to foreclosure”).
11. Zachary T. Brumfield, The “Short Cut” to the Stabilization of the Underwater
Housing Market: How the New FHFA Short Sale Guidelines Promote Economic Efficiency,
41 REAL EST. L.J. 456, 457 (2013); Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Eligibility and Foreclosure
Alternatives in the HAMP Home Affordable Refinancing and Foreclosure Alternatives
Programs, 64 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 415, 419 (2010).
12. Mabry v. Super. Ct., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 201, 217 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2010); Lydia
Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing
Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1894 (2013). Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, § 14 and
OHIO REV. CODE § 2323.07.
13. Grant S. Nelson, Confronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the
Federalization of State Mortgage Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 587 (2010).
14. Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and
Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 293, 305 (1993).
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244, §§ 35A-35C; Brandon Rehkopf, Comment, Saving the
American Dream in Ohio: Crafting Incentives and Disincentives to Promote a Responsible
Foreclosure Process, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 450 (2012) (discussing Ohio’s amendments to
its Consumer Sales Practices Act regulating mortgage origination—but exempting state and
national banks).
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likewise differ from state to state.16
Despite these state-by-state variations, the desire to avoid
unnecessary17 foreclosure has been nearly universal. In a foreclosure,
homeowners lose both a home, and, in most cases, any accumulated
home equity. Lenders and investors take a significant financial hit
through the reduced value of the collateral, the costs of the foreclosure
itself, and costs associated with carrying and offloading distressed
properties.18 Communities are harmed through lost tax revenue,
increased crime, reduced property values,19 and a plethora of issues
associated with high rates of foreclosed or vacant properties.20 Due to
the overwhelming need to address the foreclosure crisis, many states and
localities have implemented special legislation or programs to address
the issues.21
The best known and most common foreclosure avoidance programs
are loan modification efforts such as the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP).22 The goal of such programs is to use a combination

16. See, e.g., Hardest Hit Foreclosure Initiative, NAT’L COUNS. OF ST. HOUSING
AGENCIES, https://www.ncsha.org/advocacy-issues/hardest-hit-foreclosure-initiative (last
visited May 13, 2014) (describing a federal commitment of $7.6 billion to different proposals
by different state housing finance agencies in eighteen states and the District of Columbia).
The resources are not available in other jurisdictions.
17. Much effort has been spent on avoiding “unnecessary” foreclosure—though little
has been written on what constitutes a “necessary” foreclosure. For the purpose of this
Article, a “necessary” foreclosure will be a foreclosure where 1) the foreclosing entity can
anticipate a substantially larger recovery from foreclosure than from any achievable
alternative to foreclosure once all costs, including reputational costs, are taken into account, or
2) a property has been abandoned by a borrower for reasons unrelated to the threat of an
unnecessary foreclosure.
18. Waters, supra note 10, at 808 (noting an average investor loss of 30% to 60% of the
outstanding balance of the loan).
19. Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Peter Smith & Wei Li, Collateral Damage: The
Spillover Costs of Foreclosures, CTR FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/collateral-damage.pdf
(estimating a total reduction in property values of $1.95 trillion caused by proximity to
foreclosed homes).
20. Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1315
(2006); Bahls & Hunt, supra note 4, at 79.
21. Walsh, supra note 6, at 158.
22. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is one of many loan
modification programs. Other programs such as proprietary modifications or modifications
pursuant to the National Mortgage Settlement tend to roughly mirror the terms of the HAMP
modifications. The detailed guidelines for HAMP are laid out in the Making Home
Affordable Handbook for Non-GSE Servicers. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: HANDBOOK FOR NON-GSE MORTGAGES (version 4.3, 2013)
[hereinafter “U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY”], available at https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/pr
ograms/docs/hamp_servicer/mhahandbook_43.pdf. Fannie Mae’s version of HAMP is
included in Section 609 of the FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2012 SERVICING GUIDE (2012),
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of interest-rate decreases, term extensions, and principle forgiveness or
forbearance to reduce the monthly payment of a loan to something a
borrower can afford while ensuring that the lender comes out ahead of
where the lender would had it simply pursued foreclosure.23 Because
HAMP has been a model for foreclosure prevention, the strengths and
weaknesses of its particular directives are likely to redound across the
industry as a whole.
B. Lender-Side Challenges to Home Preservation
Loan modification is challenging even in the best of circumstances.
Servicers24 frequently lose documents,25 request the wrong documents,26
or over represent the probability of a loan modification to borrowers.27
Servicers have been unable or unwilling to invest in competent staff to
address the problem.28 The application process has been plagued by
uncertainty and prolonged delays.29 This uphill fight for struggling
borrowers is partially a consequence of perverse incentives favoring
foreclosure to other resolutions.30
Part of the challenge arose from the reality that the mortgagee was
no longer the unified entity many programs assumed it to be.31 The
servicer, investor, mortgagee, and originator of any given mortgage are
frequently separate entities.32 If the foreclosure process advances and a

available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf (last visited May 13,
2014). Freddie Mac’s version of HAMP is included in the FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAMILY
SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE (Volume 2, C65, updated June 14, 2013).
23. John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP: An Overview of the Program and
Recent Litigation Trends, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 194, 196 (2011).
24. Mortgage Servicers are the entities responsible for communicating with and
collecting payments from borrowers and distributing those payments to investors, hazard
insurers, and taxing authorities. The decision of when and whether to foreclose is usually also
handled by the servicer. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1898.
25. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1901.
26. Kulp & Shack, supra note 6, at 220.
27. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the
Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 727, 773 (2010).
28. Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd-Frank, Preemption,
and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 171, 178 (2011)
(citing a leaked Consumer Financial Protection Bureau estimate suggesting that mortgage
servicers stood to save $20 billion by inadequately staffing loss-mitigation efforts); Waters,
supra note 10, at 814 (identifying staffing concerns and the presence of offshore call centers
that “offer little assistance in loan resolution”).
29. Braucher, supra note 27, at 773.
30. Thompson, supra note 8.
31. Thompson, supra note 8, at 764; Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1890.
32. See, e.g., Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing
Crisis, 93 B.U. L. REV. 389, 400 (2013).
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law firm is charged with completing a foreclosure, the entry of the
foreclosure firm adds yet another player to the mix. The entity charged
with making a decision on whether foreclosure is a good idea in any
given situation is often a computer program.33 The interactions of the
investor and homeowner, the ultimate stakeholders, are filtered through a
mortgage servicer that may have structural incentives against assisting
these stakeholders in reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement.34
Servicers have been less likely to modify mortgages serviced on behalf
of an outside investor than they have been to modify loans held in their
own portfolio.35 Restrictions regarding timing or permissible ways to
modify loans placed on servicers by investors can further limit the ability
of servicers to avert foreclosure, even where this is in the investor’s
financial interests.36 Changing restrictions in servicing agreements may
require the unanimous consent of an impossibly large group of
investors.37 The investors themselves have disparate interests and
incentives, depending on the seniority of the tranches they hold.38
Even communications from the same company can be disjointed
and inconsistent.39 In some instances, one employee of a servicer will
direct a borrower to stop making payments in order to receive help while
another employee in another department determines that the borrower
does not qualify and initiates foreclosure proceedings.40 As a result,
mortgage servicers often press forward with foreclosure, even where a
33 In re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618, 627 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009), rev’d, No. 09-cv-2479-JF,
2010 WL 624909 (E.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 274 (3rd Cir. 2011).
34. Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 70
(2011).
35. Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis,
55 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 752 (2013).
36. Margaret R.T. Dewar, Comment, Regulation X: A New Direction for the Regulation
of Mortgage Servicers, 63 EMORY L.J. 175, 187 (2013); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note
22, at ch. 2, § 1.3.
37. Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for
Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 419 (2009).
38. McCoy, supra note 35, at 764. McCoy concludes that the “tranche warfare”
problem is not likely a primary barrier to loan modification. It may, however, contribute to
the lower modification rates of private-label securitized loans. Id.
39. Robert G. Gibson, Advising Distressed Homeowners, DCBA BRIEF (Feb. 2011) at
24, available at http://www.dcbabrief.org/flipbook/0211/index.html. Judge Gibson identifies
“Kafkaesque bureaucracy as well as lender understaffing, employee turnover, and/or
incompetence at the frontline” as impediments to borrowers seeking loan modifications. Id.
40. Amy B. Parker, Note, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing Homeowners to Pursue
Claims of Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 985, 985 (2013); see also Dixon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 798 F. Supp. 2d
336, 339 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing a homeowner’s allegation that Wells Fargo instructed a
borrower who was current on a loan to stop making payments on the loan in anticipation of
modification, failed to review the borrower for a modification, and began foreclosure
proceedings).
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loan modification is in the best interests of both the homeowners and the
investors who ultimately own the debts.41
Increasingly aggressive efforts to get the parties to come to the
same table and work out the problem have been an ongoing theme in
legislative foreclosure-prevention efforts.42 Homeowners and their
advocates often struggle to identify who on the lender’s side has
authority to modify a loan.43 Attorneys retained to conduct a foreclosure
sale rarely have any authority beyond collecting information to send to a
contact at the servicer. The contact at the servicer rarely has any
authority beyond determining whether a packet of information is
complete and sending it to another department. Communication
breakdowns can and do occur at every step of the process.
As the foreclosure crisis has stretched on and more options have
become available, the modification landscape has improved. This may
have to do with increased experience for the servicers. It may have to do
with greater staffing relative to the need. It almost certainly has to do
with aggressive monitoring following the forty-nine state settlement.44
However, as this Article will argue, requests for loan modifications are
usually denied. The homeowners are not able to act with a united front
with full and unquestionable authority to modify the mortgage.
C. Subordinate Lien Holders
The presence of a subordinate lienholder can interfere with efforts
to avoid foreclosure.45 The presence of a second lien could also interfere
with foreclosure alternatives such as a refinance, short-sale, or deed-inlieu.46 Second mortgages also complicate efforts to modify loans.47
Often both the first and second liens are serviced by the same
entity—but owned by different investors.48 The conflict escalates where
a borrower can afford to pay one, but not both, mortgages.49 A first
lienholder has little incentive to modify a loan in order to give a

41. Eggert, supra note 28, at 173.
42. Nussbaum, supra note 12, at 1908.
43. Waters, supra note 10, at 815.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Corp, Settlement Term Sheet, Case
1:12-cv-00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist. 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.co
m/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf.
45. Vicki Been, Howell Jackson & Mark Willis, Essay: Sticky Seconds—the Problems
Second Liens Pose to the Resolution of Distressed Mortgages, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 71, 95
(2012).
46. Id. at 84.
47. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768.
48. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768.
49. Mayer et al., supra note 37, at 419.
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borrower more income to allocate to a lower-priority loan.50 Servicers
following vaguely-written servicing requirements may insist that second
liens be re-subordinated any time the first lien is modified—not because
the law requires them to do so but because they believe that an investor
requires this extra hurdle.51 A second lienholder has no incentive to
agree to a modification that extinguishes the second lien. Often the
servicer is also the second investor, which can create conflicting
incentives.52
The presence of second liens also contributes to homeowner
confusion. Often borrowers will have first and second mortgages on the
same property, serviced by the same company. Borrowers who seek
assistance recount being told that the first lien cannot be modified
because of the second, and that the second lien cannot be modified until
the first is addressed. Because second liens are often smaller, some
borrowers will dutifully continue to remit payments on a second lien,
even as the first lienholder has begun foreclosure proceedings.
II.

NON-UNIFIED BORROWERS

This Article argues that just as homeowners have, out of necessity,
dealt with the fractured and confusing realities of the contemporary
mortgage market, the lenders should work with borrowers, even where
the borrowers present a similarly disjointed or inconsistent front. Even
in cases where the ultimate solution to the conflict involves the
homeowners leaving the property, there are likely to be foreclosure
alternatives that work better for all parties. As discussed in Section III,
below, loan modification becomes nearly impossible if all owners are
unable or unwilling to present a united front. Because foreclosure is
often preceded by triggering events such as the death or incapacity of a
homeowner or a divorce,53 it is not surprising that foreclosure cases
frequently include contested titles to the home and disagreements
regarding how a delinquency should be addressed.
A. When Homeowners Are Not Unified
Problems arise when a homeowner submits an application for
assistance with a mortgage loan and the lender determines that the name

50. Mayer et al., supra note 37, at 419.
51. Been et al., supra note 45, at 97.
52. McCoy, supra note 35, at 768.
53. See, e.g., Christopher Tarver Robertson, Richard Egelhof & Michael Hoke, Get
Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65,
86 (2008).
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or names on the application do not match the name or names on its
account.54 The maker or makers of a mortgage note may not be the
owner or owners of the real estate securing that note, perhaps because
the current owner of the home is a child or surviving spouse of a
deceased account-holder. The successor in ownership and successor
mortgagee may be different than the original borrower.
Alternatively, two joint-borrowers might have conflicting intentions
regarding the debt or the property. One co-borrower may be unwilling
to participate in efforts to save the home—usually after a divorce or
other separation. Divorce is another of the most common triggers of
foreclosure.55 An initial default could be triggered by a lack of
household income prior to the entry of a final divorce judgment, because
homeowners undergoing divorce may be pre-occupied with matters other
than the mortgage, or, in some cases, because the homeowner occupying
the house has less experience paying bills.
Cases involving both domestic violence and potential foreclosure
are an area of particular concern. Pressure to speak to the mortgage
servicer with one voice could exacerbate violence or be used by an
abuser as another way to control a victim.56 Although anecdotal
evidence abounds, it is difficult to pin precise numbers to the overlap
between domestic violence and foreclosure. A 2008 study found that
slightly over half of a surveyed set of domestic violence survivors
reported either an eviction or foreclosure.57 The same study found that
54 percent of respondents reported that a lease or mortgage had been in
the abuser’s name only.58 Due to the safety concerns of that study,
detailed data is hard to obtain.59
Divorce and domestic violence are not the only cases where
borrowers might have substantial disagreements over how to handle the
property. Separated or unmarried couples may also disagree on what to
do with a jointly owned home. A contested probate or contested
bankruptcy could lead to a similar result.

54. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 2009 Mortgagee Letter 09-23,
available at http://portal.hud.gov/huddoc/09-23mlatach.doc (last visited May 13, 2014).
55. See, inter alia, Robertson et al., supra, note 53, at 86.
56. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, 27 NCLC REPORTS: BANKRUPTCY
AND FORECLOSURES EDITION 15 (Jan./Feb. 2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/p
df/domestic_violence/nclc-rpts-bankr-jan-feb-2009.pdf.
57. Adrienne E. Adams, Cris M. Sullivan, Deborah Bybee, & Megan R. Greeson,
Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 563, 577
(2008), available at http://www.wbg.org.uk/GBA_Present_2_2951060362.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Violence,
100 CALIF. L. REV. 951, 969 (2012).
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Contacting a co-owner may be difficult or impossible. A co-owner
might have moved out of the state without a forwarding address and
abandoned the home. Unmarried couples may have broken up without
dividing the house and largely lost contact with each other. A
homeowner who dies intestate may have potential heirs who cannot be
easily contacted or would need to be served by publication. This process
could take a very long time. If the claimants seeking to save the home
are not represented by counsel, it could be functionally impossible.
It is also common for lenders to move forward with foreclosure
where a homeowner dies and the lender declines to identify and
communicate with the new owner. Following the death of a borrower,
lenders frequently refuse to communicate with successor homeowners.
The Attorney General of New Mexico recently settled a case where
Green Tree Servicing was accused of fraudulently having itself
nominated as the personal representative of the estates of deceased
borrowers, even when Green Tree knew how to locate surviving spouses
or children.60 In ABN AMRO Mortgage Group Inc. v. McGahan, the
Illinois Supreme Court found that a mortgage foreclosure was a quasi in
rem action and thus needed to be brought against a personal
representative of an estate rather than, as certain lenders had previously
done, against the property itself with no required notice to heirs.61 In
reaching this conclusion, the court rightly noted that a foreclosure
judgment in Illinois was binding only against the parties joined in the
suit.62
Although Federal law prohibits acceleration of a mortgage based on
a transfer on death to a relative,63 some lenders have sent borrowers in a
circle where they would not modify the loan until it was assumed, would
not consider a loan assumed until it was current, and would not consider
a loan current until it was modified. Although recent changes in HAMP
Guidelines attempt to address this issue by directing servicers to process
modifications and assumptions simultaneously,64 it is too early to
determine whether this will be successful. Guidelines for the Home
Affordable Modification Program also provide servicers some discretion
to “use good business judgment” in “determining whether to accept a

60. Press Release, Office of New Mexico Attorney General, Mortgage Lender Accused
of Foreclosing on Deceased: AG Stops Practice by Green Tree Servicing in New Mexico
(May 6, 2013), available at http://www.nmag.gov/News?place=msg%2Fnews-list%2FBSlO2
pIFpTc%2Fj8cvZ6a8k18J.
61. ABN AMRO Mortg. Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 931 N.E.2d 1190, 1198 (Ill. 2010).
62. Id. at 1197.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j–3(d)(5) (1983).
64. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 8.8.
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document without a co-borrower’s signature,” in cases such as mental
incapacity, military deployment, or contested divorce, but offer no
further guidance.65
B. The Interests and Motivations of Homeowners
Balancing and protecting the divergent interests of homeowners
requires an understanding of those interests. A home can be a financial
asset, a source of shelter, and a piece of personal or family history. A
home loan contributes both to current debt and to future
creditworthiness. None of the many interests homeowners have in a
home and mortgage should be ignored or understated.
1. Financial Interests
A home may be the largest asset of its owners.66 Where one
borrower wants to sell the house to liquidate any equity and the other
does not, the borrower wishing to sell may have a very compelling
reason to push for a sale. If there is $300,000 of equity in the home, one
owner might wish to sell while the other owner wishes to maintain
ownership in order to live in the home. Unless the owner wishing to
retain the home has the assets to buy the other owner out, it is probably
unreasonable to ask one owner to forgo $150,000 for the sake of the
other’s housing preference.
Because foreclosed properties sell at a fraction of fair market
value,67 averting foreclosure has substantial financial benefits for both
homeowners and lenders. Failure to cooperate in efforts to avert
foreclosure has been held to constitute dissipation of a marital asset.68 It
is highly unlikely that a loan modification with an interest rate reduction
will materially detriment the interests of a co-owner, even if substantial
past-due interest is capitalized.69
65. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7.
66. Martha F. Davis, Comment, The Marital Home: Equal or Equitable Distribution?,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1097 (1983).
67. Thomas W. Mitchell, Stephen Malpezzi & Richard K. Green, Forced Sale Risk:
Class, Race, and the “Double Discount”, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 609 (2010).
68. Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse that Dissipates Property Available for
Equitable Property Distribution: A Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 112 (1991); J.
Thomas Oldham, “Romance Without Finance Ain’t Got No Chance”: Development of the
Doctrine of Dissipation in Equitable Distribution States, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL
LAWS. 501, 509 (2008) (citing Porath v. Porath, 855 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006));
Richard W. Zuckerman, Dissipation of Marital Assets in Illinois: A Review, 91 ILL. B.J. 440,
444 (2003).
69. See Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 45, at 83 n.41 (discussing the improbability
that a loan modification could materially prejudice a second lienholder). A similar analysis
applies to loan modification and joint-owners. Any amount capitalized already constituted a
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Of course, if a mortgage is delinquent and a foreclosure could be
imminent, there may not be adequate time to optimally market the
property. This is doubly true if the property is not in optimal condition.
A realtor’s commission will take another chunk out of any anticipated
proceeds. Until the housing market substantially improves, many
properties facing foreclosure will have a relatively low expected payout
at sale. A homeowner’s financial stake in the home may be less
significant than the other interests.
2. Shelter, Safety, and Non-Economic Concerns
The value of a home far exceeds its fair market price.70 Unlike
financial assets, a home is a shelter.71 A roof keeps out the rain. A
sturdy lock keeps out the neighbors. Homeowners may have nowhere to
go after foreclosure, particularly where monthly rental payments are
higher than monthly mortgage payments.72 Home preservation is an
important element of avoiding displacement or community disruption
and protecting homeowners with children whose health or education
could be substantially harmed by an avoidable relocation.73 A home is
also an inextricable element of personal identity and community
belonging.74 Scholarship has connected homeownership with increased
happiness and life satisfaction75 and the loss of homeownership with
increased mortality.76 Lost home equity, while more easily quantified, is
only a portion of what homeowners lose in foreclosure. Initiatives to
debt secured by the mortgage. While capitalization could result in a higher interest-bearing
principal, a reduction in the interest-rate is almost certain to lead to a net-reduction in future
interest, despite the increased principal balance. For capitalization-only modifications where
the interest rate remains the same, a second owner or second lienholder could be materially
prejudiced as this permits the holder of the second lien to compound interest by collecting
interest on the past-due amounts.
70. Davis, supra note 66, at 1097 (citing Duke v. Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152 (1980));
see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1982)
(describing a home as “a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association”).
But cf. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107
MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (2009).
71. Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511,
520 (2010) (identifying shelter as an important goal of foreclosure law reform and noting a
curious absence of such an obvious issue from previous scholarship).
72. Jed Kolko, Buying Cheaper Than Renting Til Mortgage Rates Hit 10.5%, TRULIA
TRENDS (June 12, 2013), http://trends.truliablog.com/2013/06/mortgage-rates-rent-vs-buy/.
73. Jacoby, supra note 71, at 522.
74. Davidson, supra note 32, at 425.
75. Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of
Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261, 2277 n.79 (2008).
76. Richard R. Daugherty, Will North Carolina’s Predatory Home Lending Act Protect
Borrowers from the Vulnerability Caused by the Inadequacy of Federal Law?, 4 N.C.
BANKING INST. 569, 569 n.3 (2000).
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prevent foreclosure should consider the entirety of the cost of a lost
home.
Concerns about shelter and safety become more complicated when
a history of domestic violence makes the property an unsafe place.77
Hazardous or unsafe conditions in a home might also mean that
preserving ownership and occupancy may not be in the best interests of a
client.
3. Credit Scores
A foreclosure has a very negative impact on credit scores and
remains on a credit report for seven years.78 Short sales or deeds-in-lieu
are comparably devastating to credit histories.79
While a loan
modification will still affect credit history, HAMP guidelines include
special credit reporting requirements to reduce the impact and duration
of a loan modification.80 If an account was seriously delinquent for a
prolonged period, it is unlikely to recover quickly. As a practical matter,
many borrowers nearing foreclosure have numerous delinquent
obligations. Many have also filed bankruptcy. Where substantial credit
damage has already been done, the marginal difference in potential
credit impact between various workout options may have a negligible
effect on a homeowner’s overall creditworthiness.
Of course, a failed attempt to modify a loan can prolong a
delinquency and delay the ability of borrower’s credit scores to recover.
If borrowers are seeking to move on and rebuild, they may have an
interest in resolving the matter with the house quickly in hopes of having
a clean credit report more quickly. If one borrower seeks to modify the
loan and keep the house, this must be weighed against the other
borrower’s interest in a complete break. On the other hand, if one
borrower has an opportunity and a desire to mitigate credit damage
through modification, the other borrower may not have a right to force a
more complete, serious default and foreclosure. A lender may decline to
foreclose and continue reporting an account as seriously delinquent over
and beyond the life of a thirty-year mortgage.

77. See generally Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15.
78. See, e.g., Credit Report Q&A: How Long Will a Foreclosure Affect My FICO
Score?, MYFICO http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/questions/foreclosure-fico-scoreaffect.aspx (Listing foreclosure as “a very negative event”) (last visited May 7, 2014).
79. Joan Gaskin, Research Looks at How Mortgage Delinquencies Affect Scores,
BANKING ANALYTICS BLOG (Mar. 24, 2011) http://bankinganalyticsblog.fico.com/2011/03/re
search-looks-at-how-mortgage-delinquencies-affect-scores.html.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 12.2.
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4. Finality
A joint-borrower may legitimately hope for the finality that a
foreclosure would bring. Some borrowers might be more comfortable
with the certainty of a quick foreclosure followed by an effort to rebuild
than with the uncertainty of a prolonged loss-mitigation process over
which they have little control.
In cases of domestic violence, a final separation of the legal
interests of the parties may be particularly pressing. Maintaining the
connection with the house might increase a chance of further abuse.81
5. Privacy
Foreclosure prevention frequently requires homeowners to submit
extensive financial information. The same information, of course, would
need to be disclosed in a divorce or bankruptcy. Owners of a house have
an interest in knowing the status of a mortgage securing the property.
They also have an interest against broad or unnecessary disclosure of
their personal information. This is particularly critical in cases involving
domestic violence where the safety of one owner could be compromised
by an unauthorized release of information or where inadequate privacy
protections could lead to identity theft.82 This concern may be greater in
cases where parties are not already required to disclose financial
information to each other as part of a divorce proceeding.
C. Motivations That Do Not Require Special Legal Protection
1. Abuse and Control
Too often, domestic violence survivors also face foreclosure.83 The
stress of the foreclosure process can trigger—or at least exacerbate—
domestic violence.84 Alternatively, if an abuser is removed from the
home, the corresponding loss of income could render the survivor unable
to continue paying the mortgage without a loan modification.85 Even if
the survivor has sufficient income to make the mortgage payment, a
pattern of financial abuse could cause a borrower to not know how far

81. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15.
82. See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 59, at 978.
83. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15; Camille
Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: Moving Forward in Lawyering
and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 265-66 (2011).
84. See Stephanie Armour, Foreclosures Take an Emotional Toll on Many
Homeowners, USA TODAY (May 14, 2008, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/
economy/housing/2008-05-14-mortgage-foreclosures-mental-health_N.htm.
85. Carey, supra note 83, at 265-66.
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behind the mortgage is, that the mortgage is delinquent, or in some
circumstances, that the debt exists at all.86 Some survivors may not
know whether or not they even own a home.87 Others have been
defrauded or coerced into signing a mortgage or signing over an interest
in the home.88
A lender’s loan modification requirements may be used by abusers
to control their survivors.89 Abusers may attempt to use their required
signature as leverage in other disputes or attempt to force the home into
foreclosure in the belief that this will result in the survivor being
homeless. As reprehensible as this motive is, the peculiarities of the
modification process make this an achievable goal for the abuser. A
survivor may be told, for example, that the loan could be modified to
create an affordable payment if, and only if, the survivor reaches out to
an abusive co-borrower to secure a signature.90 This can give an abuser
a de facto veto over a survivor’s continued shelter.91
2.

Spite

The same types of behavior may also arise in cases of animosity
between parties undergoing divorce or other separation where no
violence is present. Individuals attempting to force a home into
foreclosure act against their own apparent interests and may be
motivated by a desire to extend a system of coercive control—or may
simply be motivated by run-of-the-mill spite. The disjunct in the parties’
86. Littwin, supra note 59, at 994.
87. Littwin, supra note 59, at 986.
88. Littwin, supra note 59, at 993. Advocates representing borrowers who may have
signed a mortgage under duress or under fraudulent pretenses should remember that both
fraud and coercion are defenses to an action to enforce a deed. See, e.g., Brown v. Pierce, 74
U.S. 205, 210 (1868) (fraud pled as a defense to a contract or deed is not limited by a statute
of limitations in the same manner that fraud pled as a tort would be).
89. See Littwin, supra note 59, at 953. Littwin discusses the problem of coerced debt in
a general consumer context. The problem is particularly acute where the debt is mortgage
debt and a failure to pay the debt could result in homelessness.
90. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7 (Requiring the signature of all
borrowers except in narrow cases such as incapacity or contested divorce. There is no listed
exception for never-married co-borrowers where it is unsafe for one borrower to contact the
other).
91. This Article, to the extent possible, avoids gendered pronouns when discussing the
perpetrators and victims of domestic violence. Despite this effort, research has shown that the
type of controlling violence at issue in such cases is, at least in heterosexual relationships,
almost always perpetrated by men against women. Michael P. Johnson, Conflict and Control:
Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence, 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
1003, 1003 (2006). A failure to acknowledge this gross asymmetry would render any article
on the subject incomplete. Whether policies of mortgage servicers that disparately impact
victims of domestic violence violate fair lending or fair housing laws is beyond the scope of
this article.
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goals may be a result of violence, could be a result of a mutual desire to
hurt the other through whatever mechanism is available, or may be
somewhere on a spectrum in between. While borrowers acting out a
mutual desire to harm each other may be a less compelling social
concern than the systems of violent abuse and control discussed above, it
is owed no deference by policymakers. Spite is not a legally protected
interest.
III. COMMON PROBLEMS AND PARTIAL SOLUTIONS
Conflicts between parties with shared interests are hardly unique to
the world of homeowners facing foreclosure. There are, however,
certain aspects of the lending and foreclosure process that make them
particularly challenging to resolve.
A. Lack of Resources and Representation
Borrowers facing financial hardship frequently will not have an
attorney to assist in a probate or family law matter. If a parent dies with
no assets other than an over-secured home, the children may not probate
the estate promptly. A divorcing couple representing themselves may
not have an attorney assist with the drafting of a final agreement. Even
where a legal services attorney may help with a divorce or a home
preservation case, there will often not be full representation in both
matters. Some legal services programs, for example, have much lower
income caps for divorce cases than for home preservation cases. Even
where income permits representation in multiple cases, legal aid
programs are unlikely to be able to help all eligible applicants. Many
areas do not have legal assistance attorneys who are adequately trained
in foreclosure law.92
For the borrowers in non-judicial foreclosure states this problem is
complicated further. In a judicial foreclosure, a homeowner receives a
summons and complaint directing them to take specific action in court.93
In a non-judicial foreclosure, the borrower may receive different types of
notice, but does not appear in a judicial proceeding unless they can

92. Frank S. Alexander, Dan Immergluck, Katie Balthrop, Philip Schaeffing & Jesse
Clark, Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial Foreclosure States, 31
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 360 (2011) (discussing uneven distribution of legal assistance
attorneys trained in foreclosure law and a resistance to providing funding to alleviate the
shortfall). But cf. Attorney General’s HomeCorps: Borrower Representation Initiative,
OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF MASS., http://www.mass.gov/ago/about-the-attorn
ey-generals-office/community-programs/ago-grants/homecorps-borrower-representation-initi
ative.html (last visited May 13, 2014).
93. Alexander, Immergluck, Balthrop, Schaeffing & Clark, supra note 92, at 343.
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manage to bring the suit themselves.94 This can be particularly difficult
for unrepresented borrowers. Even though most mortgages require an
entity seeking to foreclose to notify the borrower of the right to bring a
court action to challenge an alleged default “or any other defense of
Borrower to acceleration and sale,”95 it is not always clear what that
cause of action is.
A subset of problems with the availability of representation arises
where there is a conflict of interest between co-owners.96 If a legal aid
attorney is representing the homeowners and their interests diverge, there
may be no attorney available to help either party.
B. Three Timelines, Three Decision-Makers
One problem that has plagued foreclosure prevention efforts is the
practice of dual tracking where servicers will proceed with foreclosure
while loss-mitigation efforts are pending.97 This leads to two problems.
First, costs related to the foreclosure process accumulate while the lossmitigation process is pending. Second, if the foreclosure process ends
first, the loss-mitigation efforts cannot be completed. Due to shorter
time frames in non-judicial foreclosure states,98 this is a bigger problem.
Under the National Mortgage Settlement, dual tracking should no longer
occur.99 This resolves some of the timeline problems. However, the
problem remains that the decision on whether a contested foreclosure
can legally proceed and whether a loan can be modified happens in an
entirely separate forum. Additionally, a home defense case may have
judicially-established timelines. A bankruptcy court, for example, might
wish to close a case before a final decision can be made by the lender
regarding loss-mitigation.
This problem becomes even more complicated if there are legal
proceedings adjudicating the interests of the borrowers. In a contested
divorce, a judge may not be willing to wait six months while the parties
explore a loan modification with the lender. Dividing property

94. Alexander, Immergluck, Balthrop, Schaeffing & Clark, supra note 92, at 343.
95. See FREDDIE MAC, supra note 9, at ¶ 22
96. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56 (discussing particular
concerns where a firm that assisted in a foreclosure prevention case could later be prevented
from assisting in a domestic violence case).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of America Corp., Settlement Term Sheet, Case
1:12-cv-00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist., 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.co
m/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf (last visited May 13, 2014).
98. Alexander et al., supra note 92, at 344.
99. United States v. Bank of America Corp, Settlement Term Sheet, Case 1:12-cv00361-RMC, A-17 (D.C. Dist., 2012), available at https://www.mortgageoversight.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Servicing-Standards.pdf (last visited May 13, 2014).
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encumbered by a mortgage requires knowledge of the terms of the
mortgage and whether and under what terms they are likely to be
modified. At the same time, a lender may not be willing to allow a loan
modification until the divorce is complete or to stay foreclosure
proceedings while a divorce or probate matter is resolved.
C. Notice and Privacy Problems
A joint mortgagee, with or without the cooperation of the other
mortgagee, has a right to keep the mortgage current by paying the
monthly mortgage payments or to redeem the property by paying the
entire amount due. Most mortgages also provide a right to cure or
reinstate a mortgage by tendering any past due payments, even after
acceleration.100 Exercising this right requires that the borrower know
how much is owed. Various practices of lenders can interfere with this.
First, most mortgages have a clause stating that all notices must be
sent to only a single designated address.101 If two borrowers are living
separately, there is no provision that would allow them to each receive
notices. In domestic abuse cases, this has resulted in an abuser having
notices forwarded to a postal office box to conceal the fact that the
mortgage was not paid. This could be done both by making the request
of the servicer or by filing a change of address with the post office.
In an age where electronic notice can be sent at virtually no cost,
such clauses are an anachronism. Nor would providing a second notice
to a joint account holder be out of line with existing law. Federal
privacy law, for example, permits institutions to provide joint account
holders with a single copy of a privacy notice unless one or more
borrowers requests separate notices.102 Adding similar language to an
amendment to the Mortgage Servicing Rules under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X)103 could effectively resolve
this issue.
Lenders have also cited privacy laws when prohibiting disclosures
of any information regarding the account—even to those with a
legitimate interest in paying the mortgage. The broad reading of privacy
100. See Freddie Mac, supra note 9, at ¶ 15.
101. See Freddie Mac, supra note 9, at ¶ 15 (“There may be only one designated notice
address under this Security Instrument at any one time.”); see also Nelson, supra note 13, at
601 (discussing efforts to standardize mortgage law through the use of uniform instruments.
Presently, the vast majority of home mortgages either use a Fannie/Freddie Uniform
instrument or a substantially similar document).
102. 16 C.F.R. § 313.19(g).
103. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Docket No. CFPB-2012-0033,
REGULATIONS.GOV, available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB2012-0033-0019.
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laws may be part of an effort to set one policy that complies with the
financial privacy laws of all fifty states.104 This has caused particular
problems where the borrower who had been primarily responsible for
paying the mortgage dies. If a spouse or child inherits the property, the
lender may refuse to communicate with the child or require a lengthy
assumption process before communicating. If the loan account is
already delinquent, this delay could turn a solvable problem into an
impossible one.
Finally, the insistence on treating borrowers as a unified entity
interferes when one borrower does not wish to be contacted pursuant to
the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act105 and the other borrower
seeks to communicate regarding the status of an account. While the
Ninth Circuit has held that borrowers may waive the rights created by a
cease communication directive sent pursuant to section 1692c(c) of the
Federal Debt Collection Practices Act,106 little or nothing has been
written on how a debt collector should proceed when one co-debtor asks
the collector to cease communication and the other co-debtor seeks
communication for the purpose of resolving a delinquency.
These problems could be easily resolved with only minor changes
in lender procedures. First, permitting multiple notice addresses is a
simple action that could prevent many communication problems. With
the consent of a borrower, having notices sent to multiple addresses
could also be helpful for homeowners who for reasons related to
capacity or infirmity periodically have trouble promptly responding to
bills in a timely fashion but have friends or family members who are
able to assist them. Similarly, servicers should have clear policies
stating that all mortgagors are entitled to an accounting of the mortgage,
whether or not they are personally liable on the loan. Where servicers
are unable or unwilling to voluntarily adopt policies that both protect
borrower privacy and allow homeowners to know the status of their
account,107 regulators should consider amending servicing regulations.

104. See Andrea Lee Negroni & John P. Kromer, Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Tip of the
Privacy Iceberg, 118 BANKING L. J. 958, 967 (2001) (encouraging financial institutions to
incorporate a periodic review and update of state privacy laws in their compliance program).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(c) (2006).
106. Id.; Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir.
2006).
107. Cf. Littwin, supra note 59, at 978 (citing concerns that current, impersonal systems
have permitted identity theft by intimate associates while preventing borrowers from finding
the correct person to speak to about the loan).
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D. There Are Rarely Concerns About Recourse
A foreclosure alternative that allows one borrower to avoid future
liability on the loan could, in theory, limit a bank’s ability to collect a
judgment for any deficiency if the home was ultimately foreclosed. In
practice, deficiency judgments are rarely pursued. Many states, by law,
protect or limit deficiency judgments following foreclosure.108 Even
where pursuit of a deficiency is legal, it is rarely pursued. The flagship
HAMP program explicitly permits modification where one or more
borrowers has effectively transformed a mortgage loan into a nonrecourse loan through a Chapter 7 filing.109 So long as any owner being
removed from the loan is not contributing income to the household,
concerns about removing one borrower from the obligation are unlikely
to substantially affect a lender’s bottom line.110 For a prudently
underwritten loan, a lender’s security in the event of default is the
property—not the other assets of a questionably-solvent co-obligor.
IV. POSSIBLE WAYS TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS
The problems discussed above are all species of the same, more
general problem. Two mortgagors and one mortgagee are three parties
with three sets of interests—not two. While the mortgagors often have
aligning interests, this is not always the case. This problem becomes
more difficult to resolve when the primary interests of the parties are
fundamentally divergent in nature. The lender’s interest is primarily
financial. One owner might be primarily interested in retaining the home
as shelter. A co-owner’s interests could be financial or could be
something else entirely—such as ensuring that the first owner doesn’t
get to keep the house. The matter cannot be fruitfully negotiated unless
one party is somehow removed or the three parties are brought together
at a common table with a referee. Pretending that co-owners with
divergent interests can or should act with one voice does not solve the
problem.

108. Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—a Fresh Start, 21 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 124 (2013).
109. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 8.5.
110. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 5.7 (requiring the signature of all
original borrowers on documents, except in cases where a borrower is deceased or divorced,
including the Request for Modification Affidavit that includes documentation of income).
Because the HAMP guidelines provide this protection for formerly married borrowers
following divorce, they may also be required to provide similar protections for never-married
borrowers following a similar life change. See Foreclosures and Domestic Violence
Survivors, supra note 56.
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A. Can One Homeowner Be Removed?
1. Legal Options
An order in a domestic relations case can transfer ownership of the
property and responsibility for making payments on the loan.111 In some
circumstances, a suit for partition might allow one owner to remove a
joint owner—provided the interests of the other owner can adequately be
protected.112 A mortgage may not be accelerated based solely on a
transfer from one spouse to another.113 If borrowers are unmarried, the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, in conjunction with the Garn St. Germain
Act, may prohibit acceleration where a transfer would have been
protected had the borrowers been married.114 If a non-occupying coborrower has relinquished the property through a quitclaim, HAMP and
similar programs permit modification of the loan.115
Absent an order transferring ownership, one borrower may be able
to obtain a power of attorney from the other borrower—either
voluntarily or by order of the court—authorizing the first borrower to
execute any documents related to the home. In cases in which one
borrower is deliberately trying to sabotage loss-mitigation efforts, this
could prevent the borrower seeking a workout from having to return to
court for a contempt order each time the servicer sought additional
documents.
2. Refinance, Redemption, and Repurchase
A property owner may redeem a mortgaged property by paying the
entire amount due on the mortgage prior to foreclosure.116 In the rare
case where an owner, or somebody willing to help the owner, has
adequate cash reserves to redeem the mortgage, the owner could simply
do so. In cases where the current owner was not personally obligated on
the original loan, reports of delinquent payments would not cause
damage to the owner’s credit score. A refinance may also be a viable
option. In some cases, lenders have been willing to accept a “short
payoff” where the owner tenders less than the amount the lender believes

111. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16.
112. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16.
113. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j–3 (2006).
114. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 16.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 22, at § 1.2.
116. James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of
Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 137 (1997).
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is due and the lender releases the lien.117
A refinance for less than the amount originally due is, in rare
circumstances, an option. Although a lender may be understandably
reluctant to underwrite a new loan to a borrower already at risk of
foreclosure, lenders may be willing to do so as a loss-mitigation measure
on an existing portfolio loan.118 This could be structured as a principal
write-down on the original loan followed by a refinance or as a full
refinance coupled with an immediate principal write-down.
Depending on state law, borrowers may have a right to purchase a
property at a foreclosure sale. In practice, this would need to be a cash
purchase because lenders typically will not underwrite loans without a
title insurance policy119 and no title insurer is likely to insure a loan to
purchase a property at a foreclosure auction.120 In practice this means
that the only bidders at foreclosure auctions tend to be lenders or
investors.121 There is, however, no reason that a lender could not, prior
to the auction, agree to guarantee to finance a bid up to a certain amount
for a borrower.122 For example, a foreclosing lender could offer to
extend a new loan to a homeowner in an amount comparable to the
present value of the home. While there is some risk that a third party (or
even the other owner) would show up and enter a higher bid, this could
effectively lead to title vested in one owner, securing a loan with an
affordable payment. Because any other owner, claimant, or lienholder
would have notice and an opportunity to show up at sale and enter a
higher bid, concerns about collusion between the purchasing homeowner
and the foreclosing party are minimized.

117. See, e.g., Mortgagee Letter 09-52, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV.
(April 2, 2014, 8:57 PM), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=09-52ml.pdf.
118. A portfolio loan is a loan in which the debt is owned by the current servicer.
Portfolio loans may have more workout options because the servicer is not bound by contracts
with a third party investor. Brian S. Weinhart & Todd M. Moore, Understanding
Modification Options Under Portfolio and CMBS Loan Structures, 8 ANDREWS SEC. LITIG. &
REG. REP. 1, 1 (2009) (discussing workouts in the context of commercial loans).
119. Ron Lieber, After Foreclosure, a Focus on Title Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/your-money/mortgages/09money.html (last visited
May 13, 2014).
120. Mike Giusti, Fantasizing About Foreclosure? Novice Investors Beware, MSN
REAL ESTATE, http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107739 (last visited
May 13, 2014).
121. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1420 (2004). Nelson and Whitman cite the
requirement to provide a substantial down payment in good funds as a primary barrier.
122. Id. at 1419.
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B. Coordination of Timelines
Unnecessary foreclosure can also be avoided by ensuring that
timelines for resolving title to the house are coordinated with foreclosure
timelines. If resolving ownership of a house requires a probate process
or divorce process to run its course, courts, advocates, and lenders can
push to ensure that the respective processes proceed in a manner that
preserves as many options as possible. For lenders, this could simply
mean delaying foreclosure while another legal proceeding occurs.
Alternatively, lenders could grant a provisional modification contingent
upon a homeowner providing, for example, a copy of a divorce decree
awarding title to the home. This could allow a lender to transform a
delinquent account into a performing account while other proceedings
are pending.
It might be objected that efforts to synchronize timelines of the
various decision makers result in a de facto adoption of the slowest
timeline. If delay in a probate or divorce proceeding prevents
foreclosure, a homeowner could have an incentive to draw out the
proceedings for as long as possible. This may be a particularly
compelling objection in light of existing concerns by some
commentators that foreclosure timelines already take too long.123 More
recent scholarship, however, has raised concerns that a rush to
foreclosure has stood in the way of finding alternatives to foreclosure.124
Ultimately the foreclosure process, like every other legal process, takes
as long as it takes. A mortgage lender need not be entitled to a faster
recovery than any other litigant at the expense of the homeowner.
Delays related to long dockets and understaffed courthouses affect all
litigants. In practice, many of the delays are caused by a lender’s
inability to review documents125 or respond to discovery requests in the
allotted time frames.
Many of these problems regarding timelines are resolved in judicial
foreclosure states, where foreclosure requires an action to be brought
against a homeowner or the representative of an estate.126 Courts
123. Nelson, supra note 13, at 586.
124. Dewar, supra note 36, at 187.
125. Kulp & Shack, supra note 6, at 219 (citing lender’s failure to request, expectation
of documents in unconventional and counter-intuitive forms, and provision of inaccurate or
contradictory directions to borrowers as a primary cause for delays or denials of loan
modifications). This article addressed cases where a third party was assisting in the workout
process and providing some level of supervision to the lender. Presumably the normal
absence of any oversight would result in similar or worse problems.
126. See, e.g., ABN AMRO Mortg. Group, Inc. v. McGahan, 931 N.E.2d 1190, 1197
(Ill. 2010) (requiring that a foreclosure suit be bought against the estate of a deceased
borrower rather than against the home itself); see also Michael W. Zientz, Why Deceased
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overseeing foreclosure cases have the power to stay the case to permit
other courts or other proceedings a reasonable time to reach a
conclusion.
V. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE CAN BRING COMPETING INTERESTS INTO
THE SAME COURT
While all of the proposals above might resolve specific cases, they
are all imperfect in that they do not accomplish the goal of getting all the
parties with all their diverse interests into the same room with a neutral
adjudicator with the power to determine ownership of the property. The
way to do this is judicial foreclosure.127 This process is necessary to
protect the substantive and procedural rights of homeowners.128 Courts
have long been equipped to deal with litigation involving numerous
parties with divergent interests, including parties that may not be present
in the action at issue.129
Traditionally, all owners and obligors would be named parties in a
foreclosure proceeding.130 With all interested parties in court,131 the
entirety of any title suit may be resolved. Parties in disagreement can
further avail themselves of existing alternative dispute resolution options
courts may have established.
It is particularly important that courts have the ability to hear the
entirety of a dispute or the authority to stay the matter while the
Borrowers Cause Title Problems in Texas, USFN (2006), available at
http://www.usfn.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=USFN_E_Update&Template=/CM/HTMLD
isplay.cfm &ContentID=2746 (describing a similar process in Texas from an industry
perspective).
127. Judicial foreclosure is far and away the most effective approach to the problems
outlined in this Article and the most challenging to implement. See, e.g., Elizabeth Renuart,
Toward a More Equitable Balance: Homeowner and Purchaser Tensions in Non-Judicial
Foreclosure States, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 562, 585 (2012); see also Alexander et. al,
supra note 91, at 349 (stating that while pushing for judicial foreclosure would seem desirable
from a borrower’s perspective, it might be more politically viable to push for incremental
change).
128. But cf. Nelson, supra note 13, at 587 (lambasting the irregular patterns of state
laws designed to protect and preserve the due process rights of homeowners faced with the
loss of the property that is likely both their largest asset and their sole source of shelter as
“quaint”).
129. Andrew J. Kazakes, Protecting Absent Stakeholders in Foreclosure Litigation: The
Foreclosure Crisis, Mortgage Modification, and State Court Responses, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1383, 1415 (2010) (discussing state courts’ ability to represent the interests of both absent
investors and absent community members).
130. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark & Herbert Brownell, Jr., Joinder of Parties, 37 YALE
L.J. 28, 41 (1927).
131. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 121, at 1403 (noting that a typical judicial
foreclosure process requires service of all parties whose interests may ultimately be prejudiced
by the foreclosure).
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remainder of the dispute is litigated in another forum.132 Determinations
limited to default or non-default are insufficient to fully protect the rights
of borrowers.133 Unrestricted jurisdiction is necessary to avoid a
multiplicity of suits.134 Similar efficiencies occur in Chapter 13
adversary proceedings.
A judicial foreclosure also has a finality that a non-judicial
foreclosure does not have.135 A judicial foreclosure bars a subsequent
unraveling of the sale through the doctrine of res judicata.136 This is
particularly important in cases where joint owners have a disagreement
regarding the status of the property. Where one homeowner does not
want to own a distressed home, few things would be more frustrating
than having a co-borrower successfully challenge and unravel the sale.
A judgment in a judicial foreclosure, including a default judgment, could
permit one owner to effectively and permanently relinquish any right to
the property.
Opponents of judicial foreclosure often cite costs and efficiency
concerns. These concerns may be overstated. Because a non-judicial
foreclosure state does not require a judicial determination prior to
foreclosure,137 foreclosures in those states do not have the finality a
judicial determination could bring. Massachusetts, for example, is a
non-judicial foreclosure state, which permits foreclosure pursuant to a
statutory power of sale.138 However, Massachusetts practice usually
includes a limited suit to determine whether a party is entitled to the
protections of the Sailor and Service Members Civil Relief Act
(SCRA).139 Although this is generally an abbreviated suit140 where
defendants who are not entitled to SCRA protections lack any standing,
it requires filing, service, and delays connected with both court dockets
and the answer period. This is particularly confusing to pro se
132. Advocates may consider counterclaim to try title or a cross-claim for partition in
cases where it may be necessary for a court to reach a determination on title other than an
order permitting foreclosure.
133. Timothy J. Peterkin, Getting to the Arguments: How Legitimate Defenses to
Foreclosure Are Raised, 3 CHARLOTTE L. REV. 253, 264 (2012) (discussing circumstances
where a mortgage was entered by a party with a clear inability to contract who could not assert
fraud or incapacity in a North Carolina hearing before a clerk).
134. See, e.g., id. at 274 (discussing cases where homeowners would simultaneously
defend a legal action to stop a foreclosure sale and prosecute an equitable suit to enjoin the
sale with no possibility of joining the two cases).
135. Renuart, supra note 125, at 563.
136. Renuart, supra note 125, at 565.
137. Alexander et al., supra note 91, at 345.
138. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183, § 21 (2004 & supp. 2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 244,
§ 14 (2004 & supp. 2013).
139. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Matt, 981 N.E.2d 710, 713-14 (Mass. 2013).
140. Id.
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homeowners who attempt to answer the suit, are told they lack standing,
and do not know where to turn. Following this abbreviated process,
non-judicial foreclosure is permitted. However, evicting a former
homeowner after foreclosure requires a second judicial proceeding.141
Homeowners or former homeowners have the opportunity to challenge
the validity of the sale in this action.142 In practice this means that the
same matters are litigated—but a homeowner prevails only on the matter
of possession.143 Quieting title requires a third suit in a different court.144
If the foreclosing party is different than the plaintiff in an eviction suit,145
settlement can be inhibited.
A Chapter 13 Bankruptcy may be an option for homeowners who
can afford a Chapter 13 plan. Because this stays collection proceedings,
it could effectively bring all parties into the same suit.146
CONCLUSION
The world of lending, securitization, servicing, and foreclosure
involve a vast array of entities, frequent internal conflicts, and a level of
opacity most consumers cannot penetrate. A house is a real-world
physical asset with a value that extends far beyond its mere appraised
value. In part because of this, individuals who own or claim to own the
same home may have varying and conflicting interests. In short, a
foreclosure is a variety of title dispute between entities that are far more
complicated than a unified mortgagee and a unified mortgagor.
Because the stakes are so high for the owners, it is imperative that
these conflicts be resolved through a process that respects the rights of
all involved.
This requires paying careful attention to both
communications and timelines to avoid conflict or avoidable loss.
Ultimately, the stakes and complexity of the interests involved should be
handled judicially, by an institution that has long been equipped to
handle high stakes, complicated conflicts.

141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239 (2004 & supp. 2013).
142. Bank of New York v. Bailey, 951 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Mass. 2011).
143. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 239, § 7 (2004 & supp. 2013) (stating, “[t]he judgment in
an action under this chapter shall not be a bar to any action thereafter brought by either party
to recover the land or tenements in question . . . .”).
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 2012 SERVICING GUIDE 801-34 (2012),
available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide/svc031412.pdf (directing servicers to
retain attorneys to conduct proceedings in the servicer’s name but vest title in Fannie Mae’s
name through an assignment of the bid) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
146. Foreclosures and Domestic Violence Survivors, supra note 56, at 15-16.

